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ABSTRACT
Scholars have tended to treat the European Union (EU) as an environmental ‘leader’. Yet
signiﬁcant potential nonetheless exists for it to learn lessons in areas such as water policy
where it has a long and successful history of involvement. The EU’s Water Framework Directive
(2000) imposes potentially far reaching requirements on its Member States to enhance public
participation in the process of catchment management. However, to date, its implementation
has been highly variable across and even within individual states. As the EU starts to revise the
original Directive, thoughts will turn to how the current situation could be improved. One
potentially productive avenue, which has not yet been fully explored, is to draw lessons on
public participation from comparable multi-levelled governance contexts such as in the USA
and Australia, where public engagement has arguably been more advanced. Drawing on
theoretical accounts of the most likely facilitators and obstacles to lesson drawing, this
paper assesses the scope for transfer. It ﬁnds that while the EU could potentially learn
from these jurisdictions, there are likely to be signiﬁcant obstacles in practice. These
should be born in mind by would-be policy learners. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons,
Ltd and ERP Environment.
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Introduction
S
CHOLARS HAVE CONTINUALLY IDENTIFIED THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ‘LEADER’ (E.G. ZITO,
2005; Jordan and Adelle, 2012) or entrepreneur, and hence a fertile source of lessons for policy-makers outside
Europe. The EU has certainly attempted to position itself as a normative ‘transfer agent’ (Stone, 2004) or
global soft power actor in areas such as climate change (see, for example, Jordan et al., 2010). Yet drawing
lessons is potentially a two-way rather than a one-way street: EU policy-makers themselves can potentially learn much
about practices in other (multi-levelled) political systems. One conspicuous example may lie in the EU’s promotion of
public participation in catchment management, where it arguably lags behind other political contexts.
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Catchment management in the EU is mandated by the Water Framework Directive (WFD). Introduced in 2000
and scheduled to be fully implemented in 2015, its preamble (Ofﬁcial Journal, 2000) suggests that it marks a radical
departure from previous command-and-control type water policies. It states that Member States should ensure all
their waters are of a ‘good status’ by 2015. Crucially, it requires Member States to engage in river basin management
planning (RBMP) at the catchment scale and to cooperate with other countries where catchments are trans-boundary.
The purpose of this paper is to explore another equally innovative feature: the requirement for public participation in
planning. Under Article 14 of the Directive, Member States are obliged to promote stakeholder engagement in
implementation via publicizing information to the public on the planning process and inviting them to comment
(Ofﬁcial Journal, 2000).
Although the WFD provides a legally embedded framework for enhancing participation, emerging evidence
suggests that, in reality, this aspect of the Directive has been highly variable (WWF/EEB, 2009; WWF, 2010; see also
Demetropoulou et al., 2010). Some Member States, for example, have not started public consultations despite the
passing of a deadline in 2009 (Deloitte/IEEP, 2011). These variations suggest the need for further research into
how participation is enacted and, more saliently, how it could possibly be improved amongst Member States.
Although such an aim is raises normative concerns, we equate ‘better’ participation within decision-making that
moves beyond perfunctory and tokenistic engagement to deeper forms of citizen management: a transition captured
by Arnstein’s much cited ‘ladder’ of public participation (Arnstein, 1969: 217). Critics, however, argue that ‘good’
participation should also include a focus on aspects such as timing, deﬁnitions of citizen engagement, costs
and informational biases (Huitema, 2002). Research into these issues is timely as the EU begins the process
of reassessing the implementation of the Directive and, in time, considers future revisions.
One way of addressing the challenge of improving participation is to draw on international comparative studies to
provide a basis for drawing lessons (Benson and Jordan, 2011a). A lesson in this context is deﬁned as ‘a detailed
cause-and-effect description of a set of actions that government can consider in the light of experience elsewhere’
(Rose, 1993: 27). Lesson drawing has already been applied to water governance in various contexts (e.g. Benson
and Jordan, 2007; Swainson and de Loe, 2011). There are two obvious sources of lessons for the EU in this respect.
One is to share practices in different Member States, a process already occurring under the Common Implementation
Strategy (CIS) introduced in 2003. Some Member States have advanced systems for involving the public, while others
have less accessible decision-making processes. In principle, much scope also exists for researchers to facilitate
cross-national learning through exchange of ideas, providing of course that demand exists for policy lessons.
Lessons could, however, also be imported from other comparable (i.e. federal) multi-level governance systems
such as the USA and Australia. This presents a potentially attractive proposition for several reasons. First,
comparison has already been employed to facilitate cross-contextual learning in relation to other aspects of EU
environmental policy (e.g. Schreurs et al., 2009). Secondly, the USA and Australia also have experiences of
promoting public participation in catchment planning (Sabatier et al., 2005; Margerum, 2008) that in principle
could be applied by the EU. Finally, comparison allows direct examination of how higher level ‘federal’ policies
in these two countries shape participation at lower levels as a basis for lesson drawing and potential policy
change.
So, what can comparison teach us about how different federal systems stimulate public participation in catchment
management? In practice, multiple constraints potentially exist in relation to the successful importation of policy
lessons, related to the uniqueness of individual policies developed in one context and the problems of inserting them
into a different political setting (Benson and Jordan, 2011a; Swainson and de Loe, 2011). These constraints, in turn,
structure the type of lesson drawing that may occur. Rose (2005: 81) identiﬁes several strategies, from direct
‘photocopying’, through to ‘synthesis’ (combining elements of different programmes to create new ones) and
mere ‘inspiration’ or ‘imitation’.
Given the inherent complexities of direct copying between contexts, we focus our analysis on the potential for
imitation by posing several questions. First, how is public participation understood? Normative arguments relating
to the need for public participation in environmental management are brieﬂy discussed. Secondly, how are public
participation requirements currently expressed in the WFD? An overview of its key requirements on public
participation is provided in the next section, along with a brief overview of current developments and critical
issues, focusing on the uneven pattern of implementation between Member States. Thirdly, what are the potential
constraints to lesson drawing in practice? Theoretical arguments on lesson drawing and its analogous term policy
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transfer are reviewed to understand the critical determinants. Finally, on this basis, what lessons can the EU potentially
learn from US and Australian policy approaches on promoting effective public participation? Some recommendations
are identiﬁed to guide future policy-making.
Participatory Environmental Governance
Public participation is currently de rigueur within environmental governance (Bulkeley and Mol, 2003). Although
the notion of participation is hotly contested within the environmental governance literature, it is invariably taken
to mean an element of citizen control over decision-making whereby ‘participants often engage in deliberation over
extended periods of interaction, discussion and debate’ (Chilvers, 2009: 401). A bewildering variety of mechanisms
have been identiﬁed to facilitate the engagement of the public, stakeholders and other specialists (Rowe and
Frewer, 2005). These include focus groups (Burgess et al., 1998), citizens’ juries (Crosby, 1999; Huitema
et al., 2007), consensus-building methods and ‘deliberative mapping’ (Burgess et al., 2007), through to more
collaborative forms of environmental management that directly involve citizens in planning (e.g. Sabatier
et al., 2005; Margerum, 2008).
The effectiveness of public participation remains a continued source of debate and hence a basis for greater
evaluation (see Coenen et al., 1998; Chess and Purcell, 1999; Chilvers, 2009; Newig and Fritsch, 2009), although
participatory forms of environmental governance are undoubtedly more common. They have evolved in response
to several drivers such as a reaction to the perceived top-down and scientiﬁcally elitist tendencies of traditional
environmental governing by ‘empower[ing] voices often marginalised in science-policy processes’ (Chilvers, 2009:
400). Meanwhile ‘post-normal’ scientiﬁc uncertainties and disputes over problem deﬁnitions surrounding some
intractable environmental issues (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993) have enhanced the imperative for greater public
dialogue.
Another driver of public participation, and one which is especially relevant to the aims of this paper, is its
promotion as a normative goal through international and supra-national policy. The 1992 United Nations Rio
Declaration, Agenda 21, and the 1998 UN Aarhus Convention stress that public participation is essential for
promoting sustainable development. Participation norms have subsequently become incorporated into national
and supra-national legislation, with EU environmental policy in particular privileging public engagement. For
example, the Directive (2003/4/EC) on public access to environmental information implements the Aarhus
Convention. In the ﬁeld of water policy, the 1992 Dublin Principles and Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 have also
helped to promote greater public participation. The Dublin Principles state that:
‘The participatory approach involves raising awareness of the importance of water among policy-makers and
the general public. It means that decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with full public consultation
and involvement of users in the planning and implementation of water projects.’ (UN, 1992)
Three features of participation in catchment management are thus established: ﬁrst, that policy-makers and the
public should be informed about water management (awareness-raising); secondly, decision-making should occur ‘at
the lowest appropriate level’ (i.e. subisdiarity) so as to be closer to citizens; and thirdly, decision-making should involve
‘full public consultation’ and the ‘involvement of users’ in planning and implementation (i.e. what might be called
deliberative engagement). According to many commentators, genuine participation should involve the engagement of
individuals in a deliberative process that ‘promotes political dialogue aimed at mutual understanding’ (Smith and
Wales, 2000: 53; see also Hendricks, 2009). This notion relates strongly to deliberative democracy (see Dryzek
2002), which favours inclusive decision-making whereby ‘reasoned debate transforms judgements in the face of
publicly convincing arguments that appeal to the “public good” rather than individual self-interest’ (Chilvers, 2009:
401–2). Within the EU, these participation norms signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the design of the WFD. Although
implementation has been rather variable, the Directive has nonetheless raised expectations about public engagement
in Member States.
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Participation in the WFD: Sinking or Swimming?
The WFD has a rather curious history. After national governments unsuccessfully attempted to ‘repatriate’
parts of the existing EU water acquis communautaire during the great subsidiarity debate of the early 1990s (Benson
and Jordan, 2008), demands surfaced for a more joined-up approach. Acting on invitations from the EU
Environment Council and the European Parliament, in 1997 the European Commission published a proposal for
an integrated water policy. It provided the basis for the WFD, which was eventually adopted in 2000. As
discussed above, it contains several innovative features, including the requirement to promote participation
in water management.
Public Participation Requirements
Public participation requirements are contained in three main parts of the legislation. The Preamble of the Directive
requires ‘close cooperation and coherent action between . . . [EU], Member States and local level as well as on
information, consultation and the involvement of the public, including users’ (Ofﬁcial Journal, 2000: 2). This
requirement is qualiﬁed in Section 46 of the Preamble, which states that public participation is dependent on
‘proper information of planned measures’ and reporting on plan development (ibid.: 5). More detailed obligations
for ensuring public participation are contained in Directive Article 14. Member States are obliged to ‘encourage
the active involvement of all interested parties in the . . . production, review and updating’ of RBMPs (ibid.: 17).
For river basins, states should publish timetables and work programmes for plan production, an overview of
management issues and draft plans for public comment. Information employed in producing the draft plan
should also be made available. Finally, Annex VII states the information required in plans and subsequent
revisions, which includes ‘a summary of the public information and consultation measures taken, their results
and the changes to the plan made as a consequence’ (ibid.).
More speciﬁc guidance is contained in the CIS. According to this document, which is non-binding, the Directive
provides for three types of participation, categorized in terms of: ‘information supply’, ‘consultation’ and ‘active
involvement’ (CEC, 2003: iv). Member States are required to make publicly available information relating to plan
production, including background documents and data employed. Consultation occurs in the three plan production
stages, outlined in Article 14, with the public invited to comment. Active involvement can be understood as occurring
where interested parties or ‘stakeholders are invited to contribute actively to the process and thus play a role in advising
the competent authorities’ (ibid.: 26).
Three other factors are relevant to how these public participation obligations are implemented: timing, scale and
stakeholders. The timing of participation is detailed in Article 14. Member States must ‘publish and make available
for comment to the public, including users’ information as the plan is developed. Scale implications of participation
are somewhat contradictory, with the Directive implicitly basing actions at the river basin scale while EU Commission
guidance (CEC, 2003: 19) argues that implementation ‘will require activities at many different scales’ from the local,
sub-basin to the national. It goes on to identify the local scale as signiﬁcant for participation as here ‘the effects of
management will be felt most directly’ (ibid.: 20). Indeed, the scope for local-level responses to river basin
districts to be scaled up (and vice versa) is explicitly recognized. Stakeholders are not deﬁned in the Directive
but ‘interested parties’ are now taken to mean ‘any relevant person, group or organisation with an interest in the issue’,
including ‘government, local authorities, non-governmental institutions, political organisations, research institutes,
industries, agriculture, households or other businesses’ (ibid.: 63, emphasis added).
Public Participation in Practice
Together, the Directive and the CIS provide a framework for encouraging public participation. Nonetheless, evidence
emerging from Member States shows signiﬁcant divergence in how it has been enacted. The WWF-EEB
(2009: 12), for example, claimed that ‘RMBPs mostly do not reach the public’. Doubts have also been over
the effectiveness of participation mechanisms, particularly in translating the views of non-governmental
organizations into planning outcomes (WWF, 2010).
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Constraints to Lesson Drawing
Given the rather uneven contours of public participation emerging between and within Member States, how could
practice be enhanced? The Commission could try to give its guidance greater legal force, but this is likely to be
resisted by states on subsidiarity grounds. Alternatively, as outlined above, greater cross-national learning could
be encouraged through mechanisms such as the CIS. Finally, experiences abroad could also be carefully
assessed to determine the scope for comparative lesson drawing. The rest of this paper concentrates on this
third option.
Lesson drawing and its analogous term policy transfer1 are hardly innovative (Benson and Jordan, 2011). Politicians
have engaged in ‘systematically pinching ideas’ (Schneider and Ingram, 1988) since time immemorial. What is new is
the propensity of policy lessons to transfer extra-territorially across time and space as globalization and enhanced
communications have increased information sharing between decision-makers (Dolowitz, 2000; Rose, 2005). For
example, transfer has occurred on water governance institutional arrangements between Australian states (Swainson
and de Loe, 2011). For some policy-makers and academics, lesson drawing has also become an active project promoted
to generate practical solutions to speciﬁc problems to governments (Rose, 1993, 2005). In addition, national governments
have become lesson drawing agents through their growing participation in international and supra-national governance
through processes such as Europeanization (e.g. Bulmer et al., 2007).
Systematizing Lesson Drawing
So how, in theory, do policies voluntarily transfer – or not – between jurisdictions? In his seminal text on lesson
drawing, Rose argues a key question addressed is ‘[u]nder what circumstances and to what extent can a programme
that is effective in one place transfer to another’ (Rose, 1991: 3). Rose has modelled lesson drawing through a ‘ten
step’ procedure for practitioners (Rose, 2005). His template describes a systematic, step-wise process involving
speciﬁc stages needed ‘to determine whether or to what extent programmes in operation abroad could and should
be applied at home’ (ibid.: 8). For Rose, this linear process starts with conceptualizing programmes and generating
or promoting a policy need for lesson drawing amongst policy-makers – steps 1 and 2 (ibid.: 8–9). Then proponents
must actively seek out programmatic prescriptions abroad that potentially ﬁt the problem – steps 3 and 4 (ibid.).
Then build a ‘generalized model’ and modify this model to ﬁt with speciﬁc national contexts – steps 5 and 6
(ibid.). Lastly, the lesson must be adopted in a form that ensures its success – steps 7–10 (ibid.). Therefore,
the actual physical process of lesson drawing involves four broad developmental stages (Figure 1) that constitute
an evaluation of policy ‘ﬁt’. Lesson drawing, we argue, can be divided into a demand and supply side (Benson
and Jordan, 2011a).
Obstacles to transfer
In theory, what structures or constrains lesson drawing? Rose (1993: 118) argues the ‘critical task in lesson-drawing
is to identify the contingencies’ affecting transfer between contexts. But what exactly are these ‘contingencies’?
Multiple arguments are made in the lesson drawing and policy transfer literature on potential constraints to this
process, some provided by Rose himself. On examination, these constraints are apparent at each stage in the process
(see above), allowing us to develop a detailed framework for analysing or predicting transferability (or ‘fungibility’,
ibid.: 118). We can categorize them as demand, programmatic, contextual and application constraints.
Demand-side constraints exist where no obvious enthusiasm for learning is evident amongst policy-makers. Rose
thus talks about policy-makers as ‘satisﬁcers’: maintaining the status quo wherever possible (Rose, 1991; see also
Bache and Taylor, 2003: 280). ‘Bounded rationality’, providing cognitive limitations on how new policy options
are evaluated (Simon, 1981), path dependency (Pierson, 2004) and entrenched interests are therefore signiﬁcant
constraints to voluntary transfer – and those like Rose who promote lesson drawing as a normative strategy. The
inference made is that learning will be demanded more in instances of policy failure, instability and where
1Policy transfer differs from lesson drawing in that it can also be coercive while lesson drawing is a voluntary act (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996).
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knowledge of speciﬁc problems is limited, thereby shifting political values and stimulating interest in workable
solutions elsewhere.
Other signiﬁcant constraints are apparent on the supply side. Most obviously, practitioners require an intimate un-
derstanding of the conditions under which policies function in other contexts, i.e. the potential ‘exporter
jurisdiction’ (Page, 2000: 2). Programmatic constraints to developing such understanding include limited knowledge
of the ‘uniqueness’ of a policy, something seen as critical because a policy feature that will only readily function in
its original environment cannot be transferred (Rose, 1993: 118). This notion also includes understanding of the ‘wider
social and policy context’ that contributes to its effective functioning (Dolowitz, 2003: 106). In addition, for Dolowitz
and Marsh (1996: 353) it is the ‘complexity of a programme [that] affects its transferability; the more complex a policy
or programme is the harder it will be to transfer’.
Constraints also exist in ‘importer’ jurisdictions (Page, 2000: 2), i.e. contextual constraints. Path dependency
and policy layering are important issues, with Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 353) arguing that ‘[p]ast policies con-
strain agents as to both what can be transferred and what agents look for’. Similarly, another related issue is the
relative density of institutional and political structures in which actors undertake lesson drawing (Wolman,
1992). By their nature, denser institutional environments exert more powerful constraints to would-be inward
transference. Political context is therefore critical although public policy-making is itself shaped by competing
actors each trying to exert their values reﬂexively. Robertson (1991: 54) notes how ‘[p]olitical factors strongly
affect the way . . . lessons are drawn and transformed into public policy’. Therefore, heightened ‘politicization’
(ibid.) can act as a powerful inhibitor. Resources are another key issue, with Rose (1993: 119) arguing that in
drawing lessons, ‘claims on the resources of law, public administrators, and money should be within the scope
of the agency considering it’. Political systems must consequently possess ‘the political, bureaucratic and
economic resources to implement the policy’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 354). Another structural factor
is the role of political ideologies (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 353), political values (Rose, 1993) or ‘culture’
(de Jong, 2009: 147). Ideological consistencies between countries can be a signiﬁcant factor as policies
appear to transfer more easily between similar political systems and like-minded actors (Dolowitz and
Marsh, 1996: 354). Another constraint could be differentials in biophysical conditions between jurisdictions
(Swainson and de Loe, 2011).
Finally, major application constraints would ensue from a requirement to change institutions or structures. As
institutions are notoriously resilient (Rose, 1993), restructuring may be unfeasible. The extent to which a policy is
‘fungible depends on the extent to which . . . [its] delivery . . . requires a speciﬁc institutional form or, contrarily,
whether there is substitutability between institutions’ (ibid.: 123). Constraints could occur due to the high transac-
tion costs of institutional adjustment in practice. The ‘scale of change’ required to accommodate a new approach
is then signiﬁcant as small-scale incremental change is easier to achieve than wholesale restructuring (ibid.: 135).
Similarly, policies themselves could need adapting for contextual constraints, which may signiﬁcantly alter their
original objectives and the scope for producing successful outcomes.
These arguments provide a framework for examining the potential transferability of participation-focused
lessons. Each constraint can be posed as a series of hypotheses linked to speciﬁc indicators for guiding research
and analysis. Where constraints are high, the scope for drawing lessons will be impaired or its chances of
success considerably diminished. On the other hand, where constraints are low, lesson drawing will be more
successful.
Understanding 
the ‘exporter 
jurisdiction’
Understanding 
the ‘importer
jurisdiction’
Application of 
policy
DEMAND SIDE
SUPPLY SIDE
Policy demand
Figure 1. Four components of lesson drawing (after Page, 2000: 2; Rose, 1993, 2005)
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Comparative Practice as a Source of Learning: What Lessons Could be Drawn?
After identifying potential constraints to lesson drawing, we now examine how participation functions within
federal catchment management policy in the USA and Australia.
The USA: Clean Water Act Section 319
Although various forms of ‘watershed planning’ are widespread and enjoy a long history in the USA, there is no
single federal-level policy for promoting catchment management that equates to the WFD. Rather, a patchwork of
legal and policy mechanisms are used by federal and state agencies to support existing or to establish new
participatory watershed initiatives at the catchment scale (Leach and Pelkey, 2001; Schlager and Blomquist,
2008). These include inter alia the Section 319 amendments to the 1987 Clean Water Act (CWA), Section
205j of the CWA which funds watershed planning, Section 320 of the CWA funding for the National Estuaries
Program, Memorandums of Agreement under the Safe Drinking Water Act (Smith and Porter, 2009), the
federal Environmental Protection Agency’s Targeted Watershed Grants Program, and government support for
farmers and Soil Conservation Districts. These are in addition to multi-scale, multi-actor governance structures
such as the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes Commissions, established under cooperative agreements between
the federal government and states.
One of the most inﬂuential measures in terms of watershed planning is the Section 319 amendments to the
CWA. In 1970, the Act introduced stringent requirements on federal agencies to prevent point source pollution
via permitting of polluters, although it largely failed to deal with non-point source pollution which continues to
be a signiﬁcant impediment to water quality in the USA. For this reason, Congress enacted the Section 319
amendments in 1987 thereby establishing a nationally consistent approach to non-point source pollution
control. Under the Act (s. 319a), states must complete non-point source pollution assessment reports identifying
sources of pollution where waters do not meet quality standards set by the CWA. States are then required to
adopt non-point source management programmes (s. 319b) detailing how pollution identiﬁed will be controlled.
Section 319 (h) of the Act then provides for federal match funding, administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), to be made available annually to states to implement management programmes via a variety of
measures but primarily via watershed planning.
As a result, states have increasingly focused their non-point source management programmes on the watershed
scale to tackle pollution sources. Section 303(d) of the CWA compels states to list watersheds as impaired where they
are failing to meet water quality standards and introduce Total Daily Maximum Loads (TDMLs) to control pollution.
Although states have considerable ﬂexibility on how Section 319 funding is employed, they have under EPA
guidance increasingly used funds to develop and implement TDMLs using a watershed planning approach within
management programmes. As a result, watershed planning has increased signiﬁcantly in the last decade, with
funding utilised by state agencies to support pre-existing community-based initiatives on the ground or to develop
new collaborative actions. Moreover, the EPA has sought to integrate Section 319 funding with other federal and
state initiatives to further strengthen the watershed planning approach2 (EPA, 2003).
Although there is no speciﬁc legal article in Section 319 for participation, as in the WFD, the role of non-state
actors is nonetheless structured into the operation of the programme by its legal requirements and implementation
guidelines. Three main ‘levels’ of participation are apparent. First, under Section 319 states must involve the
public in the preparation of state assessment reports and management programmes through providing notice
and opportunities for comment. Secondly, to receive funding, watershed plans developed to address impaired
waters must include nine mandatory eligibility elements, including:
‘An information and education component used to enhance public understanding of the project and encourage
their early and continued participation in selecting, designing, and implementing the nonpoint source
management measures that will be implemented.’ (EPA, 2008: 2–16)
2These include funding provided to farmers and Soil Conservation Districts for improving water quality by the United States Department of
Agriculture, and source water protection programmes under the Safe Drinking Water Act.
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Thirdly, the EPA is using the policy to promote collaborative watershed planning. In its 2003 guidelines for
implementation of state management programmes under Section 319, the EPA strongly states its intention to fully
support the watershed approach:
‘whereby local stakeholders join forces to develop and implement watershed-based plans that make good sense
for the particular conditions found within their communities.’ (Federal Register: II3)
Taken together, these factors ensure public participation plays an important role in managing non-point source
pollution, although the system is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to allow differing approaches to emerge in speciﬁc contexts.
Measuring the success of these participatory, community-based watershed schemes is problematic on a national
scale as there are no consistent data on whether water quality is improving. However, numerous case studies
provide evidence that Section 319 is promoting ‘a vast network of community based action on a watershed basis . . .
[and, in consequence] the nation is experiencing increasingly positive results in terms of both on the ground action
and actual water quality improvements’ (Federal Register: IIIa). The current EPA website lists illustrative cases of 182
partially or fully restored waters, many formerly identiﬁed as impaired by states under Section 303(d) of the CWA, that
have been improved under the programme (EPA, 2010). For example, Section 319 funding was provided to a coalition of
local and state actors in New York to successfully help reduce phosphorus loadings along the Delaware River under the
Delaware County Action Plan. Nationally, Section 319 funding has stimulated the growth of collaborative watershed
partnerships for addressing non-point source pollution (Hardy and Koontz, 2008). This research infers that the
participation in watershed management is both widespread and growing, with federal policy one signiﬁcant
factor. However, others are less certain of the relationship between collaboration and environmental improvements
(Imperial, 2005; Leach and Pelkey, 2001; Karkkainen, 2004).
Australia: The National Heritage Trust/Caring For Our Country
Current Australian approaches to catchment management reﬂect a long evolutionary development characterized by
a gradual centralization of policy from the local-state level to the Commonwealth. The ﬁrst attempts to manage water
resources at the catchment scale in an integrated manner date back to the 19th century, although the 1917 Murray-
Darling Basin Commission is considered the precursor to current practice (Robins, 2007). Integrated regional-scale
planning of environmental resources became progressively more widespread across Australia in the early part of
the 20th century and was followed by the growth of participatory, community-based approaches to integrated land
management characterized by the Landcare movement. Landcare was a community-based initiative which supported
voluntary and farming groups in their efforts to tackle environmental issues, most saliently soil erosion and salinization.
Due to its success, Landcare members lobbied the federal government to promote the initiative nationally. In 1990, the
government announced the Decade of Landcare policy – a funding mechanism that provided $360 million (AUD) to
support community groups (Curtis, 1998). This ethos was carried forward by the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT),
established by the Commonwealth government in 1996 to provide funding for community-based natural resource
management (NRM) in response to the lack of a coordinated response to environmental problems between Australian
states. The Natural Heritage Trust extension (NHT2) was subsequently instrumental in establishing regional-scale
governance structures across Australia for steering NRM activities at the local scale.
The current initiative, Caring For Our Country (2008), builds on the NHT approach through directly supporting
regional NRM governance structures and allowing these organizations to bid for funding under a business plan
model. With this approach, the Commonwealth has made up to $171 million in investment funding available on
a competitive bid basis. This amount is in addition to $138 million directly allocated annually to regional NRM
organizations to support environmental protection activities. The current approach helps to promote participation
in NRM through a business plan model and NRM funding.
Participation is structured into the Business Plan funding application process. Applicants are obliged to ‘involve
effective partnerships’ constituted by different groups, including local communities (Commonwealth of Australia,
2010: 98). Applications must also include a communication strategy designed to ‘disseminate information to the
broader community’ (ibid.). Business plans should also consider how speciﬁc community groups might be involved
by exploring ‘opportunities for Indigenous people to participate in the delivery of the targets’ and considering how
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‘environmental, Landcare and Coastcare groups might be actively engaged’. Proposals are scored against these
and other criteria in order to receive funding, meaning that without a participation strategy, projects may be
rejected. Australian governance approaches to steering participation therefore contrast with the regulatory
compulsion of the EU Directive. Financial incentives ensure this aspect of NRM is fully considered in management
on the ground.
Yet while participation may be considered central to Australian NRM governance, has it actually proved successful
in practice? Although it is too early to assess the current Caring For Our Country initiative, signiﬁcant evidence exists
from its previous policy incarnations to suggest positive participation outcomes. The Decade of Landcare was highly
successful in stimulating the participation of community actors in NRM. Curtis and De Lacy (1998: 60) show how
by 1998, there were 2500 Landcare groups across Australia with a total membership of 65000, including one-third
of farmers nationally. Further growth was experienced under the two NHT policies, with 56 regional NRM bodies
established to provide support to a signiﬁcant number of community-scale initiatives on the ground. As in the
USA, many illustrative case studies show quantiﬁable improvements in resource quality (EPA, 2010), suggesting this
form of governance is a potentially successful model for lesson drawing.
Learning from Abroad: Opportunities and Constraints
One obvious ﬁnding to emerge from these summaries is the sheer diversity in how public participation is interpreted
and enacted. Returning to our initial deﬁnition of participation in catchment management (as articulated by the Dublin
Principles), we can analyse approaches the approaches against the three indicators: awareness raising, subsidiarity and
deliberative engagement.
An obvious difference with EU approaches is the more regulatory and prescriptive approach to promoting
participation. Awareness raising is speciﬁed in the Directive in terms of the requirement on Member States
to publish or make available information relating to plan production, including data and background documents, at
speciﬁc points in the planning process. Decision-making should be devolved down to the river basin scale, with a
scaling up and scaling down to local levels, although in reality subsidiarity infers national-level control as Member
States must ultimately implement the Directive. Finally, deliberative engagement is predicated on the consultation
of stakeholders in the river basin management planning process. Speciﬁc opportunities for engagement are speciﬁed
although evidence emerging suggests a relatively low level of interaction (EEB/WWF, 2009).
Section 319 funding represents a quite different style of participation to the WFD. States must ensure watershed
organizations include an education and outreach programme within their funding applications. Subsidiarity is
promoted by sharing decision-making between federal, state and watershed organizations. Deliberative engagement
is not speciﬁed in the requirements of Section 319, although states are compelled to make non-point source
assessment reports and programmes available for public comment. However, most US watershed organizations
are based on collaborative principles of engaging multiple actors, including community groups, so that participative
practices are strongly encouraged by the policy (see Hardy and Koontz, 2008; Sabatier et al., 2005).
In Australia, participation is more structured into the implementation of the Caring For Our Country policy via the
business plan model. Organizations are compelled to demonstrate how they will raise awareness via a communication
strategy for disseminating information to the public. Decision-making involves actors at several different levels, although
subsidiarity is maintained by supporting NRM governance at the regional and local scales through the funding scheme.
In fact, the scheme is deliberately predicated on community-level action. Deliberative engagement also occurs at
a community level, with the business plan model specifying partnership approaches and opportunities for
community groups, including indigenous people, to participate in decision-making.
What, therefore, could the EU in theory learn from these two jurisdictions? Given the normative underpinnings
of any response, the most straightforward answer might be ‘a good deal’. Awareness raising in the USA and
Australia appears to be more fully integrated into the planning and implementing process through the obligation
to develop mechanisms for education, outreach and public communication in order to receive funding. The
requirements in the Directive for Member States to publish information on plan preparation seem limited in
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comparison when informing the public and policy-makers. Deeper problems exist in terms of the often late
timing of public participation, and the restricted number of participants and funders.
From a subsidiarity perspective, the Directive, by comparison, appears top-down and prescriptive, tending to
promote participation as a regulatory obligation at the river basin management planning scale. Implementation
guidelines (CEC, 2003) suggest greater participatory ‘scaling up’ and ‘down’ between this institutional scale and
lower levels, although the Directive itself does not compel it. Consequently, some countries such as the Netherlands
did engage stakeholders at the local level despite the outcomes being sub-optimal (C. Dieperink et al., 2011). In
contrast, Section 319 and Caring For Our Country policies engage actors at all levels but primarily seek to support
activity at the local watershed scale.
Finally, when viewing participation in relation to deliberative engagement, EU approaches could, drawing on
Arnstein (1969: 217), arguably exhibit ‘tokenism’, i.e. public participation in decision-making does not greatly
inﬂuence management outcomes. Both the US and Australia appear more effective in engaging community groups
and non-state actors, including greater degrees of ‘partnership’, ‘delegated power’ and ‘citizen control’ (ibid.) even
though deliberative engagement is not speciﬁed to the same rigid extent as in the Directive. Again, the Caring
For Our Country approach relies on the business plan model to encourage organizations to devise their own
engagement strategies, tailored to speciﬁc NRM contexts, in order to receive funding.
Therefore, three different modes of governance to ensure public participation takes place are visible along a
continuum between hierarchical and network steering. Despite some attempts to devolve decision-making
downwards in the WFD, in public participation terms it still remains an example of hierarchical regulatory
steering based on a command-and-control policy instrument. In contrast, both the USA and Australia employ
a non-regulatory funding instrument to encourage more participative forms of catchment management that
equate more strongly to network governance, although the US system is still subject to regulatory steering
under the CWA. Australian federal approaches, in particular, seem historically successful in promoting lower
level participation through such network steering. Although ‘effectiveness’ is notoriously difﬁcult to pin down,
the EU could (theoretically) learn much from these initiatives.
But herein resides another problem. If we return to our analysis of lesson drawing constraints, there are reasons
to believe that the US and Australian approaches to participation in catchment management may be difﬁcult to
apply within the EU. Conspicuous ‘demand-side’ and ‘programmatic’ constraints are evident in policy responses.
Demand may be limited so long as Member States are struggling to implement existing requirements. Other
problems are related to the uniqueness of US and Australian federal politics and institutional structures. Considerable
differences exist in decision-making styles and cultures between national contexts that cause policy-makers to frame
issues in contrasting ways (see Rayner, 1991), a factor that could preclude lesson drawing. Analysts have already noted
the problems of lesson drawing between systems such as the USA, particularly the uniqueness of federal institutional
structures (Dolowitz and Medearis, 2009). Both the US and Australian environmental governance exhibit a form of
cooperative federalism (Benson and Jordan, 2011b), meaning the federal government must cooperate with states in
the implementation of national policy, primarily through providing conditional grants or funding to support
the attainment of national environmental protection objectives. In the USA, cooperative arrangements have
evolved to implement the CWA through the provision of grants to states. The Section 319 amendment has
increasingly been used by the federal government to steer watershed planning towards reducing non-point
source pollution in return for funding to states to implement programmes. In Australia, the federal government
has encouraged states to cooperate in NRM by providing funds through the NHT and Caring For Our Country
policies, using the Commonwealth’s comparative advantage in ﬁscal matters. As a result, non-regulatory funding
instruments have been employed in both contexts.
Contextual and application constraints are also evident, which are related to the very structure of EU environmental
policy-making. The EU is a unique system of federalism but in structural terms is probably more similar to German
administrative federal arrangements (Benson and Jordan, 2011b). Although Member States have a stake in decision-
making at the federal EU level via the Council, they are legally responsible for implementing environmental
legislation. However, unlike mature federations such as the USA and Australia, the EU is not a system of re-
distributional ﬁscal federalism, i.e. it cannot raise and dispense tax revenues (Sbragia, 2003). Although some
EU funding mechanisms such as Cohesion and Common Agricultural Policies are in theory tied into
implementation of the Directive (ENEA, 2006), to date their use by Member States has been limited
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(Deloitte/IEEP, 2011). While an attractive option for improving participation at lower levels of catchment
management may therefore be an EU-style Caring For Our Country or Landcare initiative, it may prove politically
impractical. National governments may well resent such EU intervention in their jurisdictions without a strong say in
how the money is spent. Another conspicuous constraint in this respect are Member States themselves. In the past,
governments have chosen to employ structural funding to boost regional economic growth through infrastructure
spending rather than more ecologically centred forms of development, despite recent attempts to ‘green’ this sector.
Whether national governments will ever hand over the twin levers of taxation and spending, from which they derive a
good part of their power and legitimacy, to Brussels remains doubtful.
Nonetheless, a window of opportunity exists for future policy change. One recommendation that could be
extracted from the above analysis is that any future revision of the Directive could link participation to the availability
of EU funding. In addition, the EU may consider promoting more avenues for greater citizen engagement in policy
implementation at Member State levels, in the spirit of subsidiarity. Both the USA and Australia provide some
pointers as to how more networked (and hence less hierarchical) participatory forms of governance may be achieved
in practice through different approaches to awareness raising, subsidiarity and deliberative engagement.
Conclusions
If lesson drawing on participation-related matters is accepted as a legitimate normative goal, our research reveals
several important ﬁndings. First, we explored how public participation is understood through recourse to the literature
on environmental governance. Participation in catchment management was deﬁned in terms of awareness-raising,
subsidiarity and deliberative engagement. Second, an examination of the public participation requirements of the
Directive was conducted. A close reading of the legal text and its implementing guidelines revealed that it compels
Member States to provide speciﬁc information to certain stakeholders at designated points in the planning cycle.
The overall approach to governing is, despite the downward re-scaling of some powers in the Directive, still relatively
hierarchical. Third, following on from this, problems emerging from the implementation of these requirements was
brieﬂy discussed. An overview of current developments and critical issues was provided to show that uneven patterns
of implementation are apparent between Member States. Fourth, we then reviewed the literature on lesson drawing to
identify some common constraints to transfer, categorizing these into demand-side, programmatic, contextual and
application factors. Finally, the scope for lesson drawing by the EU from US and Australia on promoting effective
public participation was assessed. By analysing two federal water policy mechanisms, namely the US Section 319
programme and the Australian NHT/Caring For Our Country policy, we drew out key differences and sources of
potential learning. Although multiple constraints exist to transferring lessons, due to differences in political and
ﬁscal structures, the EU could in theory learn much from the USA and Australia in terms of promoting greater
participation at the catchment scale through more networked-type governance based on higher level steering through
funding mechanisms. Whether the EU can, or indeed should, adopt such approaches given the various constraints
identiﬁed is of course a matter for political debate. However, with this paper we would like to encourage policy-makers
at least to look outside as well as inside the EU for lessons.
Lesson drawing is potentially a two-way street. Although our research emphasis has focused on comparative
learning by the EU, its own approach to catchment management could in turn provide potential lessons for other
multi-level governance systems, such as the USA and Australia. As mentioned in the Introduction, the EU has
consistently been held up as an environmental ‘leader’. Although manifestly not a federal state, the EU could none-
theless offer lessons on how to legally embed centrally coordinated requirements for greater awareness-raising,
subsidiarity and deliberative engagement into multi-levelled water governance. Analysts should of course remain
cognisant of cross-cultural (Rayner, 1991), political (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996) and even biophysical (Swainson
and de Loe, 2011) differences.
Our analysis also raises the need for new research which could be integrated into such a political debate. Greater
investigation is certainly needed into how the WFD is shaping national responses to participation comparatively.
Opportunities also exist for extending comparative research into other multi-level federal systems, as well as other
national contexts: the growth of catchment management practice provides many suitable venues for investigation.
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Finally, more research is required into how different policy instruments, including funding, can be used in steering
participatory processes via more networked, multi-level structures within environmental governance. As participation
is increasingly promoted as a normative project that decision-makers should engage in, issues of policy design and
effectiveness require much greater examination. Catchment management presents a potentially vital laboratory in
which to test and reﬁne proposed policy solutions.
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